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Abstract
Background: Priority setting is one of the most difficult issues facing hospitals because of funding
restrictions and changing patient need. A deadly communicable disease outbreak, such as the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto in 2003, amplifies the difficulties of hospital
priority setting. The purpose of this study is to describe and evaluate priority setting in a hospital
in response to SARS using the ethical framework 'accountability for reasonableness'.
Methods: This study was conducted at a large tertiary hospital in Toronto, Canada. There were
two data sources: 1) over 200 key documents (e.g. emails, bulletins), and 2) 35 interviews with key
informants. Analysis used a modified thematic technique in three phases: open coding, axial coding,
and evaluation.
Results: Participants described the types of priority setting decisions, the decision making process
and the reasoning used. Although the hospital leadership made an effort to meet the conditions of
'accountability for reasonableness', they acknowledged that the decision making was not ideal. We
described good practices and opportunities for improvement.
Conclusions: 'Accountability for reasonableness' is a framework that can be used to guide fair
priority setting in health care organizations, such as hospitals. In the midst of a crisis such as SARS
where guidance is incomplete, consequences uncertain, and information constantly changing,
where hour-by-hour decisions involve life and death, fairness is more important rather than less.
Background
As of August 12, 2003 there were 438 probable and sus-
pected cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
in Canada – the majority located in Toronto. In Toronto
there were forty-four SARS related deaths and over 100
health care workers contracted SARS, placing intense pres-
sure on Toronto's public health and hospital system [1].
Due to both the importance of hospitals in any health sys-
tem and the difficulties they face, improving priority
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setting (also known as rationing or resource allocation)
within hospitals is crucial. Priority setting is one of the
most difficult issues facing hospitals because of funding
restrictions and changing patient need. A deadly commu-
nicable disease outbreak, such as SARS in Toronto in
2003, amplifies the difficulties of hospital priority setting.
Key goals of priority setting in any context are legitimacy
and fairness. 'Accountability for reasonableness' is an
explicit ethical framework for legitimate and fair priority
setting in health care [2]. It is internationally recognized
as a framework that can guide priority setting in health
systems and their institutions [3-5]. According to
'accountability for reasonableness', an institution's prior-
ity setting may be considered fair if four conditions are
met: relevance, publicity, appeals, and enforcement (see Table
1).
In 2003, the outbreak of SARS further challenged priority
setting decision makers in Toronto hospitals, creating
decision making difficulties in relation to both SARS and
non-SARS patients. To what extent should the need for
containment over-ride other important needs? To what
extent should the need for quick decisions over-ride the
need for legitimate and fair decision making?
Only a few studies have directly examined priority setting
in hospitals – two focused on technology acquisition
[6,7], one on strategic planning [8], one on a hospital
drug formulary [9], and two on hospital ICUs [10,11]. The
latter four studies used 'accountability for reasonableness'
as the study framework. To our knowledge there have
been no studies of hospital priority setting during an
emergency response to a communicable disease outbreak.
The purpose of this study was to describe priority setting




To describe priority setting we used qualitative case study
methods. A case study is "an empirical inquiry that inves-
tigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context" [12]. This is an appropriate method because pri-
ority setting in hospitals is complex, context-dependent,
and involves social processes. To evaluate the description
we used the four conditions of 'accountability for reason-
ableness' (described in Table 1).
Setting
This case study was conducted at a large tertiary hospital
in Toronto, Canada.
Sample
We sampled key documents and people. We used theoret-
ical sampling to determine which people and documents
were 'key'. Included among the individuals sampled were
senior administrators, managers, physicians, nurses,
patients and family members.
Data collection
There were two sources of data: (1) over two hundred key
documents (e.g. emails, minutes of meetings), and (2) 35
interviews with key informants (senior administrators
(6), physicians (10), managers (5), nurses (5), a patient
(1), family members (2), and other staff (6)). Interviews
were audiotaped and transcribed. Interview participants
were asked to describe priority setting decisions in rela-
tion to SARS and their thoughts about it. We developed an
interview guide based on previous research and improved
it through pilot interviews with personnel from other hos-
pitals. As is traditional with qualitative studies, the inter-
view guide was modified during the study to explore
emerging themes.
Data analysis
The data were analyzed concurrent with collection using a
modified thematic approach in three phases: open cod-
ing, axial coding, and evaluation. In open coding, the data
Table 1: The four conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness'
Relevance Rationales for priority setting decisions must rest on reasons (evidence 
and principles) that 'fair-minded' people can agree are relevant in the 
context. 'Fair-minded people seek to cooperate according to terms they 
can justify to each other – this narrows, though does not eliminate, the 
scope of controversy, which is further narrowed by specifying that 
reasons must be relevant to the specific priority setting context.
Publicity Priority setting decisions and their rationales must be publicly accessible.
Revision/Appeals There must be a mechanism for challenge, including the opportunity for 
revising decisions in light of considerations that stakeholders may raise.
Enforcement There is either voluntary or public regulation of the process to ensure 
that the first three conditions are met.BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/36
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were fractured by identifying chunks of data that relate to
a concept or idea. In axial coding, the concepts were
organized under overarching themes (i.e. the four condi-
tions of 'accountability for reasonableness'). In evalua-
tion, the descriptive data were compared with the
conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness' – corre-
spondence with the framework was considered 'good
practice'; instances where the conditions are not met were
considered 'opportunities for improvement'. Concepts
were formalized and made explicit through the writing of
the findings [13].
The validity of the interpretations was enhanced in four
ways [14]. First, the coding was conducted in collabora-
tion between two researchers, thus limiting the influence
of any one person's biases. Second, the coding was
reviewed and modified by an interdisciplinary team who
provided challenges that were resolved through consen-
sus. Third, the findings were presented to participants
who verified the findings – traditionally called a 'member
check'. Finally, all research activities were rigorously doc-
umented to permit a critical appraisal of the methods
[15].
Research ethics
Approval for this project was obtained from the participat-
ing hospital's Research Ethics Board. Written informed
consent was obtained from each individual before being
interviewed. All data were kept confidential and viewed
only by the research team. No individuals have been iden-
tified without their explicit agreement.
Results
In this section we describe one hospital's priority setting
in response to SARS by focusing on the types of decisions,
the decision making process, and the supportive reason-
ing. We then evaluate our findings using the four condi-
tions of 'accountability for reasonableness'. We have also
included verbatim quotes from participants to illustrate
key points.
I. Description of priority setting
Types of priority setting decisions
There were two distinct phases of priority setting at the
hospital during the SARS outbreak. First, during the initial
days of the outbreak, decisions were made in order to con-
tain the spread of the virus. The Ontario Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) directed Toronto
acute care hospitals to establish or maintain as necessary
a SARS isolation area, restrict patient visits, limit visitors
and suspend selected patient transfers. Second, after the
initial weeks of the outbreak, was a 'ramp up' phase dur-
ing which the hospital gradually increased its level of
activity. Throughout both phases, priority setting deci-
sions can be organized according to four specific types:
decisions relating to staff and patients, beds/rooms, clini-
cal activity, and visitors.
1) Staff and patients
Staff were allocated for SARS patients in the SARS unit and
ICU, screening at the doors, manning the site command
centre, or helping out in occupational health; pregnant
and immunosuppressed staff were either redeployed to
low-risk activities or sent home; staff deemed non-essen-
tial were sent home with pay; students were sent home
and educational rounds were cancelled. General medicine
patients were transferred to other medical units to main-
tain the SARS isolation unit; out-patients who had been
waiting for non-emergency surgery or clinic appointments
were told to wait indefinitely.
2) Beds/rooms
The SARS isolation unit required negative pressure beds.
The hospital created these spaces in a specific isolation
unit on a general medicine floor, and in the ICU and
Emergency. Admissions to negative pressure beds were
decided case-by-case and were based on the assessment of
the referring physician, the hospital's infectious disease
representative, and the hospital intensivist.
3) Clinical activity
All non-emergency surgery and ambulatory care were can-
celled during the initial 7–10 days of SARS. During the
ramp up phase, clinical activity volumes increased in per-
centages allowing for urgent cases to be seen as deter-
mined by physicians. Operating room time was allotted
by division – each individual surgeon reported to their
division head the cases they considered urgent. This activ-
ity was coordinated by the hospital's command center.
4) Visitors
A 'no visitors' policy was enforced during the initial stages
of SARS except for compassionate grounds as determined
by the nurse manager or nurse in charge of the particular
unit, in consultation with the attending physician and the
hospital command centre. During the ramp up phase, the
hospital relaxed the no visitor policy according to chang-
ing directives from the MOHLTC and the human
resources available for screening at the doors.
Decision making process
Priority setting decisions were made across all levels of the
institution. We identified four groups of key decision
makers: Corporate Command, Hospital Command,
Department Management/Chiefs, and Individual Clini-
cians. MOHLTC directives were interpreted by a team of
senior administrators (corporate command) and then
communicated to the hospital's command centre. The
hospital's command centre implemented the recommen-
dations from the corporate command in accordance withBMC Health Services Research 2004, 4:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/36
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patient population requirements and physical logistics.
Department managers and clinical staff also participated
in allocating human resources and determining patient
care priorities. The corporate command was in constant
communication with the hospital's command centre who
maintained communication with the managers and other
leaders through teleconferencing and email.
Priority setting reasoning
Throughout each stage of the SARS outbreak, safety was
the primary rationale underpinning priority setting. Dur-
ing the early stages of SARS, decisions were made for infec-
tion control focused on protecting staff. During the ramp
up phase, decisions were based more on a duty to care for
patients, emphasizing the hospital's role in the commu-
nity. However, in addition, there were several other rea-
sons used in support of each decision (See Figure 1).
During the ramp up phase the reasoning shifted to
address patient need. Leaders recognized that the hospital
could not operate under the shut down conditions for
very long; urgent cases were quickly becoming emergent.
Thus, though staff and patient safety remained a primary
concern, very few of the decisions can be linked solely to
safety; rather, decisions involved clusters of reasons. Table
2 describes decisions made, the reasons used, and the
level at which they were made.
II. Evaluation of priority setting using 'accountability for 
reasonableness'
1) Relevance
Many participants confirmed that staff and patient safety
was, appropriately, the primary criterion used in the deci-
sion making process.
"I think due to the fact that this was so communicable, and I
think, certainly felt, most people felt this was all being done in
our best interest."
Some expressed concern about the relevance of the rea-
soning used in the allocation of OR time and the visitor
policy. For example, one surgeon commented that the OR
schedule was allocated by division as opposed to being
allocated by patient need. Similarly, the visitor policy was
appreciated by family members of patients on an abstract
level but some still could not understand why exceptions
to the policy could not be made in certain instances.
Many participants found it difficult to evaluate the rele-
vance of the reasons underlying many of the MOHLTC
directives because the directives did not explicitly describe
the reasoning involved.
2) Publicity
Priority setting decisions and the reasons behind them
were readily accessible to those directly involved in mak-
ing the decisions. However, even though decisions and
Reasons justifying priority setting decisions Figure 1
Reasons justifying priority setting decisions
•  Staff safety 
•  Infection control 
•  Patient safety 
•  Medical need 
•  Surgeon activity 
•  Operational need 
•  Compassion 
•  Screening capability
•  Squeaky wheel 
•  Fear of unknown 
•  Duty to care BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/36
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reasons were regularly distributed via email, or posted on
the hospital intranet and world-wide web, many felt that
communication beyond the core group of decision mak-
ers was incomplete. At the height of the crisis, MOHLTC
directives were changing almost hourly, and this made
real-time communications to the front lines difficult. It
was generally felt that communication was excellent, with
room for improvement.
Table 2: List of decisions, reasons, and decision level
Decisions: Staff and Patients Reasons Decision Level
Determine which staff to deploy to help with 
screening at the doors
Operational need; Screening capability; 
Infection control; Medical need
Hospital Command
Determine urgent patients and care for those 
first
Medical need Individual Clinicians
The hospital as a whole determined few hospital 
workers unessential
Operational need; Screening capability; 
Infection Control
Hospital Command
Redeploy staff from screening back to clinical 
areas
Medical need; Duty to care; Operational need Hospital Command
Hire screeners Medical need; Operational need; Infection 
control
Hospital Command
Remove pregnant staff from the clinical 
environment
Staff safety Corporate Command; Hospital Command
Decant staff and inpatients (25) from 8th floor 
general medicine to make room for SARS unit 
and potential SARS patients
Operational need; Medical need Hospital Command; Department Managers/
Chiefs
Separate staff entrance from visitor and patient 
entrance
Operational need; Infection control Corporate Command; Hospital Command
Send staff home Infection control Department Managers/Chiefs
Decisions: Beds Reasons Level Made At
Accept SARS patient transfers from other 
hospitals
Duty to care Corporate Command; Individual Clinicians
Each GTA and Simcoe County hospital to 
establish a SARS specific isolation unit.
Infection control MOHLTC
Hospitals greater than 500 beds will be expected 
to provide a 30 bed unit each. (Mar 27)
Create SARS unit physical space on 8B with 
negative pressure capabilities
Directive; Infection control; Medical need; 
Operational need; Duty to care
Hospital Command; Department Managers/
Chiefs; Individual Clinicians
Decisions: Clinical Activity Reasons Decision Level
Maintain emergency based activity during initial 
days of outbreak
Duty to care; Medical need Corporate Command; Hospital Command
Ramp up clinical activity Duty to care; Medical need Corporate Command
Allocate OR time by division Medical need; Surgeon activity Department Managers/Chiefs
Determine which patient needed urgent OR care 
this could be listed second
Medical need Individual Clinicians
SARS II – the decision not to cancel surgery again Medical need; Duty to care Corporate Command
Treat some 'elective cases' in the OR as being 
urgent
Medical need; Surgeon activity; Duty to care; 
Squeaky wheel
Individual Clinicians; Department Managers/
Chiefs
Determine what/who is emergent and urgent in 
terms of clinical volumes in family medicine
Screening capability; Medical need; Squeaky 
wheel
Department Managers/Chiefs; Individual 
Clinicians
Family Medicine did not go out into the 
community to provide care in the initial stages of 
SARS (care to detox centres, shelters)
Infection control; Screening capability Corporate Command; Department Managers/
Chiefs
Decisions: Visitors Reasons Decision Level
No Visitor Policy except for compassionate 
grounds (such as palliative care, critically ill 
children or visiting a patient whose death may be 
imminent)
Infection control MOHLTC
Restrict visitors for certain hours (5–9 pm) Screening capability Hospital Command
Lift visiting restrictions on case-by-case basis Compassion; Squeaky wheel; Medical need Department Managers/Chiefs
Hospitals must restrict access to each hospital 
site. Ideally, access should be restricted to one 
staff and one public entrance for each building
Infection control MOHLTCBMC Health Services Research 2004, 4:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/36
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"Even though we have a very good communications team you
know some people are still left out of the loop – they don't read
the paper they don't listen to the radio they don't read their
emails or they don't have email. So, there are still small pockets
of lack of or miscommunication, so communication is always
something that we need to improve."
3) Revision/appeals
There was no formal revisions/appeals mechanism.
Instead the hospital CEO felt it was important to address
all disagreements personally. Many participants thought
there were ample opportunities for informal discussion
and debate in meetings and email communication. How-
ever, one participant commented that without formal
appeals mechanisms, some stakeholders participated
unfairly by using a 'squeaky wheel' approach.
" [B]y appealing the process, the sickly squeaky wheel method
of appeal, we just begged, pleaded, ranted, raved, called back,
called back."
4) Enforcement
Overwhelmingly, participants thought the process was as
fair as it could have been given the time constraints and
the knowledge base at the particular time. The hospital
leadership made an effort to meeting the conditions of
'accountability for reasonableness'. However, some felt
that the decision making was not ideal.
"At a moment of crisis which I think that SARS was, there's not
always opportunity for full and open and even decision
making."
Some stated that more support and accountability imple-
menting decisions could have occurred – that there was a
gap between the decisions that were made in high level
administration and the implementation of those deci-
sions at the front lines.
"Most of us felt, you know the decisions were made, up there,
and we could understand them, we could agree with them, but
we were the ones who had to live with them. And there was
nobody who really came and asked us what that was like. There
was some, it wasn't that there was nothing – but there wasn't a
sense of being listened to the way that we needed to be listened
to, the way that we needed to be supported."
Some participants expressed concern that many staff
started relying on senior management to make many of
the decisions for them.
"When you go into another mode that commands and controls,
doesn't take too long until you understand how comfortable and
actually how easy that is. It is way easier to do what you're
told."
Conclusions
This study examined priority setting at one Toronto hos-
pital as it responded to the 2003 SARS crisis. Even though
the crisis created safety concerns and time constraints that
impinged upon decision making, this hospital endeav-
oured to meet the four conditions of 'accountability for
reasonableness'.
By describing and evaluating priority setting using the
four conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness', we
are able to identify examples of 'good practices' that other
hospital should emulate, and 'opportunities for improve-
ment' that this and other hospitals should consider.
We identified the following good practices: 1) staff and
patient safety was the primary criterion in decision mak-
ing, but each decision was based on a cluster of relevant
reasons – decision makers' use of clusters of relevant rea-
sons has been identified and discussed in a previous study
[16], 2) decisions were regularly accessible on hospital
email, intranet and the world-wide web; 3) challenges
were addressed directly by the CEO; 4) hospital leadership
made a concerted effort to meet the conditions of
'accountability for reasonableness'. We also identified the
following  opportunities for improvement: 1) patients and
families did not have access to the reasons for many deci-
sions, including the visitation policy and ramp-up of clin-
ical activities; 2) a formal revision/appeals mechanism
could help improve the quality of decision making and
alleviate the unfair reliance on the 'squeaky wheel' phe-
nomenon; 3) OR time was allocated by division, rather
than by patient need, and these decisions should be dis-
cussed more fully; 4) institutional leaders should main-
tain two-way contact with front-line staff who are
implementing priority setting decisions – this will provide
support and enhance accountability for decision making
by staff.
'Accountability for reasonableness' is a framework that
can be used to guide legitimate and fair priority setting in
health care organizations, such as hospitals. It assumes
that the time and effort required for meeting the condi-
tions of fairness is justified for two reasons: First, it is
important to act ethically and be perceived to be acting
ethically – in this case, fairly. Second, acting ethically can
help an organization achieve 'goodwill' benefits includ-
ing, but not limited to, increased trust and satisfaction and
decreased complaints. However, it is clear from this scope
of decisions examined in this study that time constraints
imposed on a health care organization by a highly
communicable and potentially fatal infectious disease cre-
ates significant priority setting difficulties. It may appear
that the conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness'
are too demanding to implement in the time constraints
– that perhaps containment should take precedence overPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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procedural requirements. We disagree. During the SARS
outbreak the hospital's leadership developed and imple-
mented several sophisticated processes to help with their
crisis management. Tailoring those processes to meet the
four conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness' is
not any more difficult or demanding. Moreover, we argue,
and some of the participants also argued, that in the midst
of a crisis where guidance is incomplete, consequences
uncertain, and information constantly changing, where
hour-by-hour decisions involve life and death, fairness is
more important rather than less.
Our findings are limited in that they may not be general-
izable to other hospitals. However, generalizability is not
the goal of qualitative studies like this. We expect that
other hospitals may benefit from the insights provided in
this study. For example, this was the first time that
'accountability for reasonableness' has been used to eval-
uate priority setting in response to an infectious disease
outbreak. Other hospitals in similar crises can use
'accountability for reasonableness' to help evaluate and
enhance the fairness of their priority setting [17].
The best assurance of fair priority setting in a crisis is fair
priority setting everyday. A health care organization that
incorporates legitimate and fair decision making every-
day, where the decision making culture of the organiza-
tion is permeated with the conditions of 'accountability
for reasonableness', will be primed to meet the challenges
of fair priority setting in a crisis. This may be the most
important lesson to take from this study.
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